On 23 June 2023, the commando of the Wagner Group announced a rally for truth and justice to end the Kremlin’s bloody war in Ukraine. The ultimatum was clear. Putin’s quest to occupy Ukraine and his corrupted army were causing the loss of hundreds of thousands of Russian troops, therefore if the demands to bring the Russian army leaders were not met, Yevgeny Prigozhin would move his forces to Moscow.

There was a soft-headed hope that a gambler and recruiter could bring about change, but in reality, he was manoeuvred by his handlers, to relinquish a tactical advantage on the way to Moscow with 200 km remaining in exchange for a dubious deal of security guarantees, personal expulsion and dismantling of PMC Wagner.

Prigozhin’s mutiny has exposed an advanced metastasis of the disorder within the Kremlin’s bureaucracy, the army, and their commercial and security affiliates.

The one-day march for Moscow revealed that the Kremlin and Putin himself are no longer immune to individual attempts to seize power. The turmoil and chaos among the ranks in Moscow has rapidly eroded Putin’s governing authority, even among his staunchest supporters.

The world has witnessed the Kremlin is losing authority and becoming a target for competing interests within Russia’s business and military groups. This development has prompted the Russian elites, the West, and the democratic opposition to weigh in on the new balance of power in Russia.

First, the West will have an additional and unique opportunity at the forthcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius to reassess its strategy more positively and to give an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO with all necessary security guarantees to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Second, the elites in Russia will draw their own conclusions. As the events unfolded there was a growing anxiety of the Russian people to accept the change for truth and justice and to support this revolt. They were tired of living in fear and tired of Putin’s occupational war, thus were willing to seize any opportunity to end it.

In fact, the readiness of the Russian people for change may have been more painful to the Kremlin’s technocracy than Prigozhin’s rally. This new situation has served as an encouraging signal in Russia to various opposing groups to build a transit strategy to end the Kremlin’s kleptocracy.

Third, this has also created an opportunity for the Russian democratic forces to seek new legitimate alliances and deepen their engagement with decision-makers in the West and the EU in particular.

The Russian democratic opposition in exile must utilise this momentum to work together with national and EU authorities in European capitals to build a vision for democracy in Russia, which should then be communicated attentively to the Russian people. Strategic communication, policy engagement and actor legitimacy are key elements in building an alternative to the Kremlin’s regime in Russia. The same applies to representatives of democratic Belarus, who have made significant progress in engaging with the West, the EU in particular.

Overall, the consequences of an approaching Ukraine’s victory will be unbearable to Putin’s regime that has already undermined its own authority. By no doubt this will add a new chapter to the strategy of the West on the future of Russia.

Photo: a Russian tank in circus, Rostov-on-Don